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Historians and sociologists of psychiatry often claim that psychiatric diagnoses are discontinuous. 
That is, a particular diagnoses will be described in one way in one era and described quite differently 
in a different era. Historians and sociologists often draw epistemic consequences from such 
discontinuities, claiming that truth is pluralistic, provisional and historicised. These arguments do not 
readily fit in with how analytical philosophers of science approach scientific realism. I show how the 
pessimistic meta induction does not capture the point which historians and sociologists are making 
but scientific perspectivism seems to capture their point much better. I then highlight conceptual 
innovations which scientific perspectivists add. They demarcate between truth and objective reality, 
they specify which type of truth they endorse and they put down constraints on possible truths. This 
blocks an anything goes relativism which historians and sociologists can be in danger of falling into. I
highlight my argument by discussing a discontinuous episode in the history of autism. I discuss three 
aspects of this discontinuity and show how scientific perspectivism can portray each aspect as non-
trivially true. My argument shows that we can be scientific realists about autism even if we can 
formulate notions of autism in quite different ways.
1  Introduction
This  paper  argues  that  scientific  perspectivism  offers  a  useful  way  to  think  about  psychiatric  diagnoses.  
Scientific  perspectivism  offers  a  view  of  scientific  knowledge  whereby  we  can  both  (i)  take  knowledge  claims 
seriously,  and  (ii)  accommodate  scientific  theories  being  historically  situated  and  replaced  over  time.  Applying  
scientific  perspectivism  to  psychiatric  diagnoses  provides  a  framework  which  respects  historical  and  
sociological  studies  of  psychiatry  whilst  simultaneously  retaining  a  non-trivial  notion  of  truth.
Historians  and  sociologists  of  psychiatry  often  claim  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  constrained  or  
constituted  by  the  historical  era  in  which  they  are  formulated  (Danzinger  1997,  p.181;  Evans  2017,  p.8;  Hollin
2014,  p.2;  Rose  1999,  p.xiv;  Verhoeff  2013,  p.443).  As  history  changes,  so  too  the  diagnoses  which  
psychiatrists  postulate  have  changed.  Additionally,  this  process  will  likely  continue  into  the  future.  Historians  
and  sociologists  sometimes  draw  epistemological  claims  from  such  changes,  although  their  claims  can  prove  
hard  to  situate  within  the  positions  that  have  been  developed  by  philosophers.  In  this  paper  I  will  draw  upon  
perspectivism  to  analyse  the  relationship  between  changes  in  psychiatric  diagnoses  and  notions  of  truth.  
Scientific  perspectivism  offers  useful  conceptual  tools  for  understanding  how  historical  changes  relate  
to  truth.  Firstly,  a  distinction  between  objective  reality  and  truth  can  be  made.  Truth  is  partly  dependent  upon 
scientists,  but  objective  reality  is  not  (Massimi  2018a,  p.170).  Secondly,  scientific  perspectivism  supports  a  
notion  of  truth  that  fits  well  with  historical  change,  namely  a  human-centred  rather  than  an  all  seeing  'god’s  
eye'  view  of  truth  (Giere  2006,  p.15;  Massimi  2018a,  p.165).  Thirdly,  perspectivists  can  offer  criteria  which  
ensure  that  there  are  constraints  upon  which  scientific  theories  can  count  as  true.  This  blocks  an  ‘anything  
goes’  relativism  where  truth  is  simply  what  scientists  happen  to  believe  at  any  particular  period  (Giere  2006,  
p.66;  Massimi  2018a,  p.172;  Massimi  2018b,  p.20).  These  conceptual  developments  allow  scientific  
perspectivism  to  endorse  a  non-trivial  notion  of  truth  which  is  relative  to  perspectives,  thereby  respecting  
history,  but  where  scientists  cannot  simply  make-up  their  own  truths,  thereby  constraining  relativism.  
The  long  history  of  scepticism  about  psychiatry  makes  questions  concerning  notions  of  truth  in  
psychiatry  particularly  urgent.  There  are  concerns  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  formulated  on  subjective  
opinion  rather  than  on  scientific  evidence  (Horwitz  2002,  p.5;  Kendell  &  Jablensky  2003,  p.7).  Psychiatric  
diagnoses  have  been  described  as  invented,  constructed,  arbitrary  or  made-up  (Burrows,  2010,  p.252;  Cushing  
2013,  p.38;  Gains,  1992  p.4;  Horwitz  2002,  p.11;  Kinderman  et  al  2013,  p.2;  Summerfield  2001,  p.95;  Watson
2019,  p.2).  Additionally,  there  are  calls  to  significantly  revise  psychiatry.  This  includes  calls  to  replace  
currently  employed  psychiatric  diagnoses  with  new,  alternative  diagnoses  (Cooper  2005,  p.150;  Kozak  &  
Cuthbert 2014,  p.960;  Murphy  2006,  p.10)  and  calls  to  completely  abandon  using  psychiatric  diagnoses  
altogether  (Boyle  1990,  p.166;  Johnstone  2019,  p.15;  Read  2004a,  p.48;  Vanheule  2017,  p.205).  Claims  that  
any  particular  claim  posited  by  psychiatry  is,  or  is  not,  true  and  claims  that  psychiatry  has  a  particular  type  
of  truth,  have  significant  potential  to  influence  how  psychiatry  is  viewed.  It  is  thus  important  to  apply  recent  
research  in  philosophy  of  science,  in  particular  the  development  of  scientific  perspectivism,  to  discussions  of  
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truth  within  psychiatry.  Whether  they  endorse  scepticism  themselves  or  not,  I  suggest  that  the  sociologists  and 
historians  I  discuss  offer  few  resources  to  avoid  their  account  falling  into  scepticism.  They  offer  insufficient  
resources  to  determine  when  a  sceptical  attitude  is  justified  and  when  it  is  not.  In  contrast,  I  argue  that  
scientific  perspectivism  is  able  to  accommodate  scientific  claims  being  historically  situated  and  changing  over  
time  whilst  still  offering  resources  to  determine  when  a  sceptical  attitude  is  applicable  and  when  it  is  not.    
I  start  by  outlining  how  historical  research  that  evidences  discontinuities  in  knowledge  claims  is  
sometimes  taken  to  have  epistemic  consequences.  I  then  compare  such  arguments  to  the  pessimistic  meta  
induction  and  scientific  perspectivism.  I  suggest  scientific  perspectivism  can  be  used  to  make  sense  of  at  least 
some  histories  of  discontinuity  in  psychiatry,  and  illustrate  this  claim  using  a  discontinuous  episode  in  the  
history  of  autism.  
2  Truth  and  discontinuities
The  history  of  a  particular  psychiatric  diagnosis  can  be  considered  to  be,  in  varying  degrees,  continuous  or  
discontinuous.  Continuity  is  where  there  is  “a  more  or  less  chronological,  linear  and  progressive  development  
towards  current  understandings”  (Verhoeff  2013,  p.442).  In  such  cases  there  has  been  stability  of  scientific  
concepts  across  the  history  of  a  discipline  or  the  only  significant  changes  consist  in  progress  towards  the  
truth.  Discontinuity  is  where  present  scientific  concepts  are  the  latest  in  a  series  of  significant  changes  across  
the  history  of  a  discipline  and  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  modern  concepts  are  superior  to  past  concepts  
(see  Danziger  (1997),  Foucault  (2001)  and  Shorter  (2015)).  Discontinuities  have  been  shown  in  relation  to  
multiple  diagnoses  such  as  post-traumatic  stress  disorder  (Young  1995),  schizophrenia  (Berrios,  Luque  &  
Villagran  2003)  and  the  diagnosis  which  I  will  focus  upon:  autism  (Evans,  2017, p.  240;  Eyal  et  al  2010,  
p.209;  Feinstein  2011,  p.265;  Hollin  2014,  p.3;  Silverman  2012,  p.130;  Verhoeff,  2013, p.  444).  Often,  
historians  and  sociologists  provide  less  detail  than  is  ideal  for  philosophically  analysing  their  conceptual  claims
(they  are,  of  course,  writing  history  and  sociology  rather  than  philosophy).  Compared  to  how  philosophers  
approach  these  issues,  it  seems  they  sometimes  gesture  towards  philosophical  views  in  a  manner  that  glosses  
over  distinctions  which  a  philosopher  might  prefer  to  demarcate.  
For  example,  note  that  the  distinction  between  continuity  and  discontinuity  is  very  broadly  drawn.  
Linearity  and  progression  are  linked  together  (as  in  the  Verhoeff  quote),  but  progress  and  linearity  should  
plausibly  be  distinguished.  A  theory  might  be  modified  in  a  linear  way  and  yet  end  up  worse.  Alternatively,  a
major  discontinuity  might  take  place,  yet  the  change  might  be  progressive.  Also,  philosophers  of  science  have  
developed  many  different  ways  to  understand  theory  change,  demarcated  many  different  ways  in  which  
changes  can  take  place,  and  it  is  unclear  exactly  how  these  relate  to  the  sociologists’  and  historians’  notions  
of  ‘discontinuity’.  This  is  important  because  different  philosophers  place  importance  upon  different  aspects  of  
theories  being  retained.  Some  scientific  realists  focus  upon  the  working  posits  of  a  theory  (Psillos  1999),  a  
structural  realist  (Ladyman  1998)  will  focus  upon  structure,  and  an  entity  realist  (Cartwright  1999)  will  focus  
upon  the  dispositions  (or  properties  or  capacities)  of  entities.  
  Historians  and  sociologists  of  psychiatry  often  discuss  notions  of  truth  but  typically  take  quite  a  
different  approach  to  philosophers  of  science.  For  example,  historian  and  sociologist  of  psychiatry  Nicholas  
Rose  discusses  notions  of  truth  within  psychiatry.  However,  he  is  concerned  
not  with  truth  in  some  philosophical  sense  but  with  the  way  in  which  systems  of  truth  are  
established,  the  ways  in  which  true  statements  are  produced  and  evaluated,  and  with  the  
'apparatus'  of  truth  –  the  concepts,  rules,  authorities,  procedures,  methods  and  techniques  
through  which  truths  are  realized  (Rose,  1999  p.4).
Rose  talks  of  how  truths  are  produced  and  realized  rather  than  about  how  psychiatrists  discover  truths.  
Consider  also  how  in  his  history  of  post-traumatic  stress  disorder  (PTSD)  Young  claims  that  PTSD  “is  not  
timeless,  nor  does  it  possess  an  intrinsic  unity.  Rather,  it  is  glued  together  by  the  practices,  technologies,  and  
narratives  with  which  it  is  diagnosed,  studied,  treated,  and  represented  and  by  the  various  interests,  
institutions,  and  moral  arguments  that  mobilized  these  efforts  and  resources”  (Young  1995,  p.5).  Despite  this,  
Young  considers  PTSD  as  being  real  and  aims  to  “explain  how  it  [PTSD]  and  its  traumatic  memory  have  
been  made  real,  to  describe  the  mechanisms  through  which  these  phenomena  penetrate  people's  life  world,  
acquire  facticity,  and  shape  the  self-knowledge  of  patients,  clinicians,  and  researchers”  (Young  1995,  p.6  
emphasis  original).  In  Young’s  view,  PTSD  is  real  even  though  it  had  to  be  made  real.  Similarly,  after  
outlining  “conceptual  discontinuities”  (Verhoeff,  2013,  p.  444)  and  multiple  changes  to  the  diagnosis  which  
have  occurred  across  the  history  of  autism,  sociologist  Verhoeff  writes  that  
in  describing  the  reshaping  of  the  concept  of  autism,  the  historicity,  provisionality  and  
plurality  of  knowledge  and  truth  about  autism  become  apparent.  As  a  consequence,  such  a  
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historical  reflection  destabilizes  the  present  ‘truth’  about  autism  as  a  neurodevelopmental  
spectrum  disorder  of  social  cognition  localized  in  an  individual’s  brain,  and  as  it  destabilizes  
the  present  ‘truth’  it  creates  space  for  other  possible  perspectives  and  conceptualizations  of  
autism  in  the  present  and  future.  The  point  is,  however,  not  to  dismantle  the  very  idea  of  
autism,  but  merely  to  correct  a  positivist  and  essentialist  understanding  of  autism  as  a  discrete
and  stable  entity  in  nature  that  we  get  to  know  and  understand  better  and  better  as  science  
progresses  and  knowledge  accumulates  (Verhoeff,  2013p.  455).
For  Verhoeff  the  truths  psychiatrists  attain  are  pluralistic,  provisional  and  historicised  truths.  
Rose,  Young  and  Verhoeff  do  not  talk  of  truth  in  a  manner  which  reflects  how  philosophers  of  
science  typically  approach  the  scientific  realism  debate.  Nevertheless,  their  claims  seem  to  have  significant,  if  
not  fully  explained,  epistemological  implications. Their  claims  have  some  relationship  to  scientific  realism  
because  they  seem  to  see  psychiatrists  as  attaining  (or  perhaps  producing)  truths.  However,  the  type  of  truth  
attained  does  not  appear  to  fit  with  typical  scientific  realism  which  does  not  easily  fit  notions  of  produced,  
historicised,  provisional  or  pluralistic  truths.  At  the  same  time  there  is  some  similarity  with  anti-realist  claims, 
in  that  currently  posited  psychiatric  diagnoses  will  not  be  the  one,  true  set  of  correct  ones.  However,  anti-
realists  in  philosophy  of  science  typically  place  significant  constraints  on  what  constitutes  good  science.  They  
typically  oppose  ‘anything  goes’  views  and  do  not  consider  all  scientific  theories  as  being  equally  good  
(Laudan  1984,  p.33).  In  contrast,  it  is  unclear  what  constraints  there  are  on  historicised,  provisional,  pluralistic 
and  produced  truths.  Consequently,  it  is  unclear  what,  if  anything,  demarcates  such  an  account  of  truth  from  
an  extreme  ‘anything  goes’  relativism  whereby  all  claims  posited  by  psychiatrists  are  equally  good.  
One  potential  danger  with  an  ‘anything  goes’  relativism  in  this  area  is  that  it  might  lead  to  a  
scepticism  about  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Critics  of  psychiatry  often  note  that  psychiatrists  keep  revising  their  
diagnostic  systems,  and  argue  that  current  diagnoses  are  shaped  by  no  more  than  fad  or  fashion.  Critics  take  
this  to  mean  that  psychiatric  diagnoses  are  “made-up”  (Watson  2019,  p.2),  “arbitrary”  (Horwitz  2002,  p.11;  
Cushing  2013,  p.38),  “constructed”  (Gains,  1992  p.4;  Summerfield  2001,  p.95),  “arbitrarily  constructed”  
(Burrows,  2010,  p.252),  and  an  “invention”  (Read  2004b,  p.21;  Summerfield  2001,  p.95).  Of  course,  
scepticism  might  actually  sometimes  be  the  most  plausible  stance  to  take  towards  psychiatric  diagnoses,  but  it 
would  be  helpful  if  resources  were  available  to  more  precisely  specify  the  circumstances  under  which  
scepticism  was  justified.  Unless  one  adopts  a  blanket  scepticism  towards  all  psychiatric  diagnoses  then  there  
must  be  some  way  to  distinguish  those  diagnoses  where  scepticism  is  appropriate  from  those  where  it  is  not.  
I  draw  upon  recent  work  in  philosophy  of  science  in  search  of  adequate  resources  and,  as  I  outline  
in  section  three,  I  show  that  scientific  perspectivism  offers  these  resources.  I  will  apply  my  discussion  of  
perspectivism  to  the  work  of  Verhoeff  (2013)  who  has  written  a  recent  history  of  autism.  This  will  allow  me  
to  make  a  detailed  analysis  of  his  claims  regarding  truth  and  knowledge  in  psychiatry.  In  his  work  Verhoeff  
argues  that  there  have  been  changes  to  notions  of  autism  across  three  periods,  roughly  the  1940s  to  1960s,  
the  1960s  to  1980s,  and  1980s  to  the  present  day.  He  uses  his  historical  analysis  to  claim  that  posited  truths  
about  autism  are  historically  embedded,  plural  and  provisional.  In  section  4  I  will  make  a  detailed  analysis  of 
the  historical  episodes  from  which  he  draws  his  conclusions  to  explore  how  compatible  it  is  with  a  
perspectival  reading.
Verhoeff  does  not  define  his  terms  when  talking  about  truth  and  it  is  not  completely  clear  why  he  
thinks  historical  changes  support  his  claims  regarding  knowledge  and  truth.  The  quoted  paragraph  from  
Verhoeff  is  the  most  concrete  characterisation  he  offers  but  leaves  his  exact  argument  and  commitments  
somewhat  unclear.  Verhoeff’s  argument  seems  partly  epistemic.  Changes  across  history  are  taken  to  undermine  
the  idea  that  there  is  progress  in  understanding  autism.  However,  the  mere  fact  of  change  in  knowledge  
claims  cannot  undermine  scientific  realism  since  a  change  might  consist  in  moving  from  an  incorrect  to  a  
correct  understanding  of  autism.  His  argument  also  seems  metaphysical.  Changes  across  history  are  taken  to  
undermine  “essentialist  understanding  of  autism  as  a  discrete  and  stable  entity”  (2013,  p.445).  However,  
changes  across  history  does  not  entitle  this  claim.  There  might  actually  be  a  stable,  essentialist  entity  which  
psychiatrists  could  potentially  succeed  in  describing  one  day,  even  if  so  far  they  have  failed  to  do  so.  
Verhoeff  needs  more  argument  to  link  changes  across  history  with  his  claims  about  knowledge,  truth  and  
essentialism.
Verhoeff’s  (2013)  claims  about  pluralities  of  truths  and  knowledge  are  also  unclear.  Taken  literally,  he 
seems  to  claim  that  there  are  multiple  truths,  rather  than  a  single  truth,  which  a  particular  knowledge  claim  
might  capture.  However,  are  all  the  pluralistic  truths  genuine  truths  or  are  some  truths  more  genuine  than  
other  truths?  Notably,  Verhoeff  puts  the  word  ‘truth’  in  inverted  commas  but  the  relevance  of  this  is  also  
obscure.  It  might  be  that  he  is  sceptical  of  the  usefulness  of  all  talk  of  truth  in  psychiatry.  Would,  however,  
this  be  because  he  believes  psychiatrists  could  never  establish  truths  in  psychiatry  (their  claims  are  not  truth  
apt)  or  merely  that  he  doubts  psychiatry  has  established  any  truths?  
In  seeking  to  charitably  reconstruct  Verhoeff’s  argument,  I  will  compare  it  with  some  work  found  in  
philosophy  of  science  which  has  at  least  some  superficial  similarities.  I  firstly  consider  an  argument  against  
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scientific  realism  known  as  the  pessimistic  meta  induction  (PMI).  I  will  suggest  that  on  examination  this  well 
known  argument  does  not  capture  the  argument  Verhoeff  aims  to  make.  I  will  then  suggest  the  less  well  
known  notion  of  scientific  perspectivism  better  fits  Verhoeff’s  approach.
The  PMI  is  usually  employed  in  response  to  the  no  miracles  argument  in  debates  for  and  against  
scientific  realism  (see  Psillos  1999  for  an  overview).  Briefly,  the  no  miracles  argument  claims  there  are  only  
two  possible  reasons  for  the  success  a  particular  theory:  either  the  theory  is  true  or  a  miracle  has  occurred.  
Since  miracles  are  not  an  acceptable  explanation  within  philosophy  the  only  acceptable  explanation  is  that  the 
theory  is  true.  In  response,  the  pessimistic  meta  induction  identifies  historically  employed  theories  which  made 
miracle  like  predictions  yet  turned  out  to  be  false.  Therefore,  a  theory  being  successful  does  not  entail  that  it 
is  true.  
This  rough  sketch  of  the  PMI  shows  superficial  similarities  to  Verhoeff’s  argument.  Both  use  as  
evidence  the  history  of  science,  showing  how  scientists  from  earlier  eras  believed  in  theories  which  are  now  
taken  to  be  incorrect.  This  suggests  that  Verhoeff  might  be  considered  to  be  an  anti-realist;  changes  across  
history  gives  good  reason  to  doubt  that  psychiatrists  accurately  describe  the  world.  
However,  considering  some  of  the  details  of  the  PMI  gives  reasons  to  doubt  this  interpretation.  
Notably,  the  PMI  focuses  on  theories  that  could  have  been  judged  successful  on  some  criteria  such  as  ability  
to  make  predictions  (Laudan  1981,  p.33).  In  contrast,  Verhoeff  does  not  focus  only  on  successful  past  
theories.  It  seems  that  changes  across  history  means  truths  are  pluralistic  for  Verhoeff  regardless  of  what  
qualities  a  particular  theory  might  have.  Secondly,  Verhoeff  talks  of  truth  being  historicised.  This  seems  to  
mean  that  truths  are  constrained  or  constituted  by  wider  factors  which  are  present  in  a  particular  historical  
era.  In  contrast,  the  PMI  is  usually  employed  independently  of  historical  analysis  of  wider  socio-cultural  
conditions.  The  success  of  a  theory  does  (according  to  no  miracles)  or  does  not  (according  to  PMI)  entail  the
truth  of  a  theory  regardless  of  the  wider  conditions  which  produced  the  theory.  The  differences  between  his  
argument  and  the  PMI,  mean  that  the  PMI  does  not  seem  to  capture  the  point  Verhoeff  is  trying  to  make.  He
sees  truth  as  historicised  and  he  offers  no  grounds  to  move  from  historicised  truths  to  non-historicised  truth,  
whereas  the  PMI  is  employed  to  undermine  the  truth  of  scientific  theories  rather  than  portray  them  as  
historicised  truths.  Beyond  the  appeal  to  history,  his  argument  seems  to  have  little  commonality  with  a  PMI  
based  anti-realism. I  now  suggest  that  Verhoeff's  position  seems  closer  to  the  spirit  of,  and  can  be  more  easily
reconstructed  to  fit,  a  form  of  perspectival  realism.  To  show  this  I  now  outline  scientific  perspectivism.
3  Scientific  Perspectivism
Scientific  perspectivism  is  typically  intended  as  a  form  of  scientific  realism  which  aims  to  accommodate  the  
claims  that  we  do  not  have  unmediated  access  to  the  external  world  and  that  scientific  knowledge  is  situated. 
Perspectivism  typically  traces  its  intellectual  heritage  to  Kant  and  Nietzsche  but  I  shall  focus  upon  Ronald  
Giere’s  work  and  recent  developments  by  Michela  Massimi.  
Scientific  perspectivism  is  intended  as  a  moderate  form  of  scientific  realism  which  retains  notions  of  
truth  and  objectivity  whilst  simultaneously  respecting  actual  scientific  practise.  Giere  writes  that  perspectivism  
“mediates  between  the  strong  objectivism  of  most  scientists,  or  the  hard  realism  of  many  philosophers  of  
science,  and  the  constructivism  found  largely  among  historians  and  sociologists  of  science”  (2006,  p.3;  also  
see  Massimi  2018a,  p.164  &  p.167).  This  middle  ground  sees  scientific  theories  as  potentially  true  whilst  
simultaneously  seeing  aspects  of  truth  as  relativised  to  a  perspective.  
Scientific  perspectivism  is  contrasted  with  views  of  the  world  which  are  perspective  independent.  
Perspectivism  sees  all  knowledge  as  being  dependent  on  the  human  perspective.  All  knowledge  claims  will  be 
limited  to  perceptual  and  cognitive  capacities  of  humans.  This  contrasts  with  a  hypothetical  'God’s  eye'  view  
of  the  world  where  there  is  no  limitation  on  how  the  world  is  viewed  (Giere  2006,  p.15;  Massimi  2018a,  
p.165).  Additionally,  scientific  perspectivism  adds  to  this  basic  claim  by  seeing  scientific  truths  as  being  
limited  to  or  constrained  by  the  practices  of  specific  scientific  communities.  Two  different  scientific  
communities  which  adopt  significantly  different  practices  would  be  considered  to  be  in  different  perspectives.
The  scientific  practices  which  constitute  different  perspectives  can  be  characterised  by  “specific  choices
of  instruments,  theoretical  apparatuses,  and  measurement  techniques  idiosyncratic  to  any  given  scientific  
community  at  any  given  historical  time”  (Massimi  2018a,  p.166)  as  well  as  the  adapted  “standards  of  
performance  adequacy  that  a  scientific  knowledge  claim  has  to  satisfy”  (Massimi  2018a,  p.172  italics  in  
original).  Perspectives  can  be  characterised  by  different  measurement  techniques  and  instruments.  Scientists  
working  in  one  perspective  may  measure  an  aspect  of  the  world  in  a  particular  way  whereas  scientists  
working  in  a  different  perspective  may  measure  that  same  aspect  in  a  different  way.  Different  equipment  
might  be  used,  and  different  factors  might  be  considered  incidental  and  so  shielded  off.  Perspectives  are  also  
characterised  by  methodological  approaches.  Two  different  approaches  might  employ  different  methodologies  
when  modelling  data  or  when  assigning  causal  priority  to  causal  factors.  Perspectives  can  also  endorse  
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different  theoretical  assumptions,  such  as  a  classical  physics  perspective  or  a  quantum  physics  perspective.  
Additionally,  two  different  perspectives  might  employ  a  different  standard  for  assessing  knowledge  claims.  
This  initial  sketch  of  perspectivism  seems  a  more  promising  means  of  capturing  Verhoeff’s  approach  
compared  to  the  PMI.  Scientific  perspectivism  sees  scientific  communities  as  occupying  different  perspectives.  
These  perspectives  have  different  theoretical,  experimental,  methodological  and  epistemic  commitments,  they  
influence  which  claims  scientists  believe  to  be  true  and  different  eras  typically  have  different  perspectives.  
This  seems  a  fruitful  way  to  make  sense  of  Verhoeff’s  claim  about  “the  historicity,  provisionality  and  plurality
of  knowledge  and  truth  about  autism”  (2013,  p.455).  Additionally,  whereas  the  PMI  takes  changes  across  
history  as  a  threat  to  truth,  Verheoff  seems  to  think  changes  across  history  are  compatible  with  some  type  of  
truth.  Similarly,  perspectivists  accept  that  there  can  be  multiple,  different,  yet  realist  descriptions  of  the  same  
target  (Giere  2006,  p.192;  Massimi  2018,  p.168)).  
Verhoeff's  position  seems  easily  open  to  relativist  and  sceptical  interpretations.  Scientific  perspectivists  
offer  three  conceptual  innovations  which  avoids  their  position  being  relativism  or  scepticism.  Firstly,  it  can  
block  an  extreme  relativism.  Unless  someone  is  an  extreme  relativist  who  thinks  that  literally  everything  
changes  (such  as  the  size  of  the  universe)  when  scientists  adopt  new  views  then  something  must  be  
demarcated  as  not  being  dependent  upon  our  views.  Perspectivists  specify  which  elements  they  consider  to  be  
non-perspectival.  Massimi  demarcates  between  objectivity  and  truth  (Massimi  2018a,  p.170).  There  is  only  one 
objective  reality.  That  reality  might  be  considered  the  non-relativised,  perspective  independent  God’s  eye  view.  
We  can  only  have  perspective  dependent  views  of  that  reality.  Similarly,  Giere  accepts  that  there  is  a  “real  
world”  (2006,  p.62)  which  we  can  have  multiple  perspectives  of.  It  could  be  responded  that  scientific  
perspectivists  have  assumed  rather  than  argued  that  there  is  something  perspective  independent.  This  is  an  
assumption  that  I  am  willing  to  make.  Even  the  leading  scientific  realist  Stathis  Psillos  admits  that  one  need  
assume  the  world  can  be  described  in  realist  terms;  it  cannot  be  argued  for  (2011,  p.312).  If  this  assumption  
is  acceptable  to  realists  then  it  seems  acceptable  to  perspectivists.
Secondly,  perspectivism  gives  an  account  of  how  perspectival  truths  relate  to  the  non-perspectival,  
objective,  real  world.  This  blocks  relativism  and  allows  a  moderate  form  of  scientific  realism  because  there  is 
both  a  real  world  and  scientific  theories  can  relate  to  that  world.  Ronald  Giere  argues  that  truth  is  similarity  
between  a  model  and  an  aspect  of  the  world.  Rather  than  employ  typical  notions  of  correspondence  with  the  
world  he  instead  employs  the  much  more  metaphysically  minimal  notion  of  goodness  of  fit.  He  argues  that  
no  one  model  can  fully  resemble  the  world  so  only  degrees  of  resemblance  rather  than  correspondence  are  
possible.  For  example,  physics  cannot  specify  the  exact  amount  of  matter  in  the  universe  whilst  sciences  like  
chemistry  and  biology  will  not  attempt  to  track  many  aspects  of  the  world  such  as  subatomic  particles  (2006, 
p.6).  Scientists  build  models  at  different  degrees  of  precision  which  can  be  idealised  or  abstract  in  different  
ways.  Decisions  over  the  desired  degree  of  precision  as  well  as  choices  over  idealising  and  abstracting  will  
partly  depend  on  the  purposes  for  which  the  scientists  create  the  model.  These  choices  will  then  influence  the
way  in  which  a  model  has  similarity  to  the  world  and  how  similarity  is  measured.  This  means  truths  are  
perspectival  since  judgements  over  similarity  are  perspectival  (2006,  p.66).
For  Massimi  facts  are  non-perspectival  (2018b,  p.354).  They  do  not  change  between  different  scientific
perspectives.  In  contrast,  truth  conditions  are  perspectival.  A  truth  condition  is  the  rules  which  determine  truth 
values.  Truth  conditions  are  the  rules  by  which  any  particular  scientific  claim  is  considered  to  be  true  or  false
(the  truth  values).  As  can  be  shown  from  historical  and  sociological  studies,  scientists  do  not  have  one  means 
of  determining  true  claims  from  false  claims.  Which  standards  they  use  to  assess  scientific  claims  depends  
upon  the  perspective  they  are  taking.  On  this  notion  of  truth,  facts  are  non-perspectival  whereas  the  rules  
which  are  used  to  assign  truth  values  are  perspectival.  This  means  that  truth  is  not  relativised  to  perspectives  
but  the  way  in  which  scientists  assess  whether  claims  are  true  is  perspectival.  This  takes  on  board,  as  
historians  and  sociologists  have  emphasised,  how  scientists  have  held  different  views  upon  what  constitutes  
truth  without  then  seeing  what  is  actually  true  as  being  relative.
Thirdly,  perspectivists  place  constraints  on  what  can  be  considered  true.  Perspectivists  need  to  avoid  
the  danger  of  endorsing  a  trivial  notion  of  truth  whereby  different  perspectives  licence  their  own  truths,  
leaving  Einstein's  physics  no  more  true  than  Aristotle’s  (Massimi  2018b,  p.20).  There  needs  be  grounds  to  
assert  that  scientists  sometimes  actually  do  posit  incorrect  theories  and  that  theories  vary  in  how  accurately  
they  describe  the  world.  Adding  constraints  upon  what  is  true  supplies  a  way  of  avoiding  an  ‘anything  goes’  
approach.  The  most  minimal  commitment  for  scientific  realism  is  “getting  things  right”  (Massimi  2018b,  
p.345).  This  means  that  not  every  scientific  theory  is  taken  as  describing  the  non-perspectival  world.  Scientific
perspectivists  offer  criteria  which  means  scientists  do  not  licence  their  own  truths.  It  is  a  variety  of  realism,  
despite  theories  and  models  being  perspectival,  because  scientific  claims  can  relate  (via  similarity  for  Giere  
and  via  correspondence  for  Massimi)  to  the  non-perspectival  world.  Scientific  perspectivism  is  not  relativistic  
and  is  realist  because  it  offers  constraints  which  means  that  some  theories  should,  and  other  should  not,  be  
considered  to  get  things  right.  It  is  not  anti-realist,  in  the  sense  of  Van  Fraassen’s  constructive  empiricism  
(1980),  because  Van  Fraassen  produces  arguments  which  makes  him  doubt  that  currently  formulated  theories  
and  models  merit  belief.  He  believes  that  various  epistemic  arguments  for  anti-realism  (such  as  the  pessimistic
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meta-induction)  are  applicable  to  most  theories  and  models.  In  contrast,  scientific  perspectivists,  by  believing  
that  truth  is  not  incompatible  with  holding  multiple  views  of  a  target,  do  not  accept  the  pessimistic  meta  
induction  as  grounds  for  anti-realism  (see  Giere  2006,  p.92).  Giere  and  Massimi  believe  that  some  theories  
and  models  pass  the  epistemic  criteria  they  offer.  
On  Giere’s  account,  truth  is  similarity  with  a  target  system.  This  is  perspectival  because,  depending  
on  the  perspective  adopted,  theories  and  models  will  differ  in  the  degree  they  have  similarity  with  a  target  
system.  Additionally,  judgements  about  similarity  are  themselves  perspectival  because  similarity  can  be  
measured  in  different  ways.  Whilst  weaker  than  an  objectivist  notion  of  realism,  this  is  not  intended  as  a  
trivial  notion  whereby  truth  purely  depends  on  the  views  of  scientists.  The  degree  to  which  a  model  has  
similarity  to  the  world  will  partly  be  based  on  the  model  having  some  resemblance  to  the  actual  world.  
Perspectival  truths  will  need  to  be  constrained  by  the  world  in  a  manner  which  goes  beyond  scientists  simply 
licensing  their  own  truths.  A  posited  theory  might  have  very  low  degrees  of  similarity  in  which  case  it  would
simply  be  wrong  and  not  merit  belief.
On  Massimi's  alternative  approach,  she  considers  whether  standards of performance adequacy  (such  as  
simplicity,  coherence,  novel  prediction,  identified  mechanism  etc.)  are  perspective  independent  standards  for  
assessing  scientific  theories.  She  argues  that  they  cannot  play  this  role.  She  highlights  how  scientists  have  
appealed  to  different  standards of performance adequacy  at  different  historical  periods  (or  at  the  same  historical  
period).  It  could  be  responded  that  regardless  of  what  the  history  of  science  shows  philosophers  can  
formulate,  independent  of  actual  scientific  practise,  cross-perspectival  standards of performance adequacy.  
However,  to  consider  the  standards of performance adequacy  which  philosophers  currently  discuss  as  perspective 
independent  virtues  would  be  to  merely  elevate  our  perspective  as  being  the  correct  one  (Massimi  2018b,  p.9).
These  claims  would  be  limited  to  a  perspective  and  future  perspectives  might  consider  different  standards of 
performance adequacy  as  the  correct  ones.  Despite this, it is still possible to assess whether a scientific claim made 
in an earlier perspective should be  “retained or withdrawn, depending on whether they continue to satisfy their original 
standards of performance-adequacy when assessed from another (subsequent) perspective” (2018a, p.172).  For 
example, “[a]ncient Greek crystalline spheres are no longer part of our current scientific perspective because they have 
long lost their performance adequacy with respect to their own original standards (e.g. stability of circular orbits, 
agreement with astronomical data, neat divisions between celestial and terrestrial phenomena, etc.)” (2018a, p.172). 
These  three  conceptual  innovations  can  be  applied  to  Verhoeff.  It  is  unclear  whether  Verhoeff’s  
provisional,  historicised  and  pluralistic  truths  are  actual  truths,  particularly  given  that  Verhoeff  sometimes  
places  scare  quotes  round  ‘truth’.  In  contrast,  perspectivists  provide  a  detailed  account  of  how  truth  relates  to  
the  perspectival  and  the  non-perspectival.  Finally,  his  account  looks  to  be  at  risk  of  falling  into  some  sort  of  
skepticism,  or  alternatively  an  ‘anything  goes’  relativism.  Perspectivism,  in  contrast,  places  constraints  on  
which  posited  truths  should  be  seen  as  actual  truths.
4  Applying  perspectivism  to  the  history  of  autism
I  now  outline  and  analyse  two  different  perspectives  which  postulated  two  different,  and  discontinuous,  
approaches  to  autism.  These  cover  two  of  the  three  historical  periods  which  Verhoeff  discusses  (he  breaks  his  
history  into  1940s  to  1960s,  1960s  to  1980s,  and  1980s  onwards;  I  will  discuss  the  first  and  third  of  these  
eras).1  I  characterise  each  perspective  by  looking  at  the  work  of  the  psychiatrist  who  developed  and  promoted 
each  account  of  autism  (Leo  Kanner  and  Lorna  Wing).  I  will  firstly  discuss  the  wider  setting  in  which  each  
worked.  Then  I  outline  their  different  perspectives,  show  how  this  resulted  in  different  accounts  of  autism  and 
then  apply  Giere's  criteria  of  similarity  and  Massimi's  criteria  of  evidence  generated  in  later  perspectives.
4.1  Two  Notions  of  Autism
The  background  to  the  first  notion  of  autism  is  psychiatric  thinking  in  the  US  and  Britain  from  the  mid-
1930s  to  the  mid-1970s  (see  Evans  2017  chapters  1,  2  and  3;  Eyal  et  al  2010  chapters  4,  5,  6  and  7;  
Nadesan  2005  chapter  5;  Silverman  2012  chapters  1,  2,  and  3;  Verhoeff  2013).  Psychiatrists  in  the  US  and  
Britain  often  placed  significant  importance  on  the  subjective,  inner  psychic  life  of  the  individual.  They  
believed  that  symptoms  might  be  the  result  of  unconscious  mental  processes,  which  were  conceived  of  as  
being  dynamic,  and  changing  over  time  in  response  to  both  external  environmental  factors  and  internal  
biological  causes  (Evans  2017,  p.68;  Silverman  2012,  p.71;  Verhoeff  2013,  p.446).  These  ideas  were  
sometimes,  though  not  always,  articulated  through  a  psychoanalytical  framework,  drawing  on  the  ideas  of  
Freud,  or  of  one  of  his  followers.  Psychiatric  diagnoses  were  typically  intended  to  play  two  roles.  Firstly,  
1 Verheoff's  discussion  of  the  1960s  to  1980s  is  much  shorter  and  involves  much  less  of  a  contrast  with  
other  eras  compared  the  first  and  third  era.
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they  were  intended  to  capture  something  of  the  subjective  experience  of  individual  patients.  This  often  led  to  
textbooks  and  diagnostic  manuals  employing  vignettes  of  patients,  or  extracts  from  case  studies,  to  characterise
psychiatric  diagnoses  rather  than  formal  lists  of  symptoms.  Diagnoses  were  meant  to  loosely  convey  the  
clinical  pictures  which  patients  can  manifest  rather  than  describe  sharply  demarcated  classes  of  patients  (Mayes
&  Horwitz  2005,  p.260;  Shorter  1997,  p.178).  Secondly,  diagnostic  categories  were  often  causally  demarcated,  
usually  on  the  basis  of  a  supposed  underlying  psychological  state  (e.g.  one  type  of  disorder  might  be  taken  to
be  characterised  by  the  utilisation  of  one  psychological  defence  mechanism,  and  another  by  a  different  
psychological  defence  mechanism).  The  diagnosis  given  to  a  patient  thus  indicated  the  supposed  presence  of  
some  supposedly  significant  causal  factor  (Evans  2017,  p.269;  Shorter  1997,  p.178).  
Around  the  1960s  trends  started  which  by  the  1980s  would  result  in  a  very  different  psychiatry.  
Firstly,  cognitive  psychology  started  being  developed  as  a  discipline.  Focus  shifted  from  unconscious,  dynamic 
processes  to  computationally  understood  modules  whereby  different  parts  of  the  mind  are  functionally  
individuated  (Evans  2017,  p.233;  Hollin,  2014,  p.14;  Verhoeff  2013,  p.450).  This  means  there  was  a  
significant  change  in  how  the  psychology  of  patients  was  conceptualised.  Secondly,  there  was  growing  interest 
in  genetics  and  neuroscience  as  a  means  of  establishing  the  causal  origin  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  (Nadesan  
2005,  p.142;  Silverman  2012,  p.144).  Some  psychiatrists  came  to  doubt  the  scientific  validity  of  
psychoanalytical  causal  explanations  and  instead  came  to  think  that  mental  illnesses  were  likely  the  result  of  
brain  abnormalities.  They  hoped  future  investigation  would  discover  the  specific  causes,  such  as  the  specific  
gene,  for  each  diagnosis.  Given  that  such  supposed  causes  were  yet  to  be  discovered  this  led  to  a  move  
away  from  an  approach  that  sought  to  demarcate  disorders  on  the  basis  of  postulated  causes,  towards  one  that
demarcated  disorders  purely  on  the  basis  of  observable  symptoms  (Blashfield  &  Keeley  2010,  p.325;  Evans  
2017  p.217;  Hollin  2014,  p.4).  They  hoped  that  grouping  patients  on  (supposedly)  observable  symptoms,  rather
than  the  (supposedly)  non-existent  psychoanalytical  defence  mechanisms,  would  act  as  a  basis  for  finding  the  
correct  (supposedly  biological)  causes.  Thirdly,  comparisons  of  how  psychiatrists  employed  diagnoses  showed  
that  there  was  often  limited  agreement  over  which  diagnosis  should  be  applied.  This  showed  that  many  
diagnoses  had  low  reliability  (reliability  is  the  degree  to  which  different  psychiatrists  provide  the  same  
diagnosis  to  the  same  patient).  Concerns  about  the  reliability  of  diagnosis  led  to  the  development  of  explicit,  
descriptive,  checklists  of  symptoms  that  were  hoped  to  make  diagnoses  more  reliable  (Decker  2007,  p.352;  
Mayes  &  Horwitz  2005,  p.260;  Robins  &  Guze  1970,  p.108).  Fourthly,  there  was  growing  interest  in  
statistical  methods  as  a  means  of  parsing  up  the  domain  of  psychopathology  (Evans  2017,  p.211;  Kendell  
1968,  p.32).  With  increasing  computing  power,  statistical  methods  might  be  employed  to  reformulate  diagnoses 
on  the  basis  of  the  observed  symptoms  of  large  groups  of  patients  (Robins  &  Guze  1970,  p.108;  Mayes  &  
Horwitz  2005,  p.256).  All  these  factors  lead  to  a  significant  shift.  With  the  intention  of  increasing  reliability  
diagnoses  were  now  intended  to  be  based  around  observable  symptoms  rather  than  unconscious  psychological  
processes. 
I  now  relate  these  changes  to  two  perspectives  on  autism.  In  1943,  Baltimore  based  child  psychiatrist 
Leo  Kanner  formulated  a  diagnosis  which  he  named  autism.  This  covered  children  who  had  difficulties  
relating  to  other  people  and  often  exhibited  repetitive  behaviour.  In  this  regard  it  has  obvious  similarities  to  
the  modern  diagnosis  of  Autism  Spectrum  Disorders  (ASD).  However,  there  are  crucial  differences  in  the  
symptoms  he  described.  Kanner  characterised  autism  as  “an  extreme  autistic  aloneness,  that,  whenever  possible,
disregards,  ignores,  shuts  out  anything  that  comes  to  the  child  from  the  outside”  (Kanner,  1943p.  242,  
emphasis  original).  As  Verhoeff  emphasises,  Kanner  associated  aloneness  with  a  withdrawal  from  the  world  
which  is  a  more  severe  clinical  picture  than  a  lack  of  social  intuition  and  a  preference  for  solitary  activities  
which  are  associated  with  the  modern  diagnosis  (APA  2013,  p.454).  The  child  does  not  just  struggle  to  
socialise  but  rather  blocks  out  or  reacts  adversely  to  interference  from  many  different  aspects  of  the  external  
world.  Kanner  also  described  autistic  children  as  having  the  symptom  ‘maintenance  of  the  same’  whereby  the  
child  wishes  the  external  environment  to  remain  static  and  wishes  no  interference  with  their  own  routines  
(Kanner  1943,  p.245).  This  is  a  significantly  more  severe  clinical  picture  compared  to  modern  notions  of  
autistic  people  who  dislike  unexpected  changes  and  often  have  quite  narrowly  focused  and  obsessive  interests  
(Verhoeff  2013,  p.445).  There  is  a  very  high  level  of  inflexibility  and  the  reactions  to  changes  to  the  
environment  can  be  very  severe.  Kanner  posited  these  quite  specific  symptoms,  rather  than  more  general  
symptoms,  because  he  valued  clinical  nuance  (e.g.  detailed  descriptions  of  patients  and  demarcating  between  
different  ways  patients  exhibit  behaviour).  
The  second  difference  was  that  Kanner  believed  autism  was  closely  related  to  a  more  commonly  
diagnosed  psychiatric  diagnosis  named  childhood  schizophrenia.  This  also  covered  children  who  had  difficulties
relating  to  others  and  who  exhibited  repetitive  behaviour  (note  that  though  they  were  called  childhood  
schizophrenic  it  was  widely  recognised  that  hallucinations  were  extremely  rare.  Lauretta  Bender,  the  main  
advocate  for  childhood  schizophrenia,  writes  that  “[v]erbal  hallucinations  akin  to  the  adult's  are  so  uncommon  
as  to  be  of  no  diagnostic  value”  (1947,  p.50)).  In  1958  Kanner  argued  that  autism  and  childhood  
schizophrenia  were  closely  related,  sharing  many  symptoms,  except  that  autism  had  a  few  specific  symptoms  
which  were  usually  absent  in  childhood  schizophrenia,  autism  was  rarer  and  usually  had  greater  levels  of  
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impairment  (Kanner  &  Lesser  1958,  p.728).  By  1969  he  would  see  autism  as  one  of  the  three  subtypes  of  
childhood  schizophrenia  (Kanner  1969,  p.3).  To  summarise,  Kanner  saw  autism  as  a  rare,  usually  severe,  
disorder  that  was  related  to  but  distinct  from  other  forms  of  childhood  schizophrenia.  The  relationship  Kanner 
saw  between  autism  and  childhood  schizophrenia  was  influenced  by  his  goals.  Kanner  believed  that  diagnoses  
should  help  the  clinician  gain  a  nuanced  understanding  of  specific  patients.  He  believed  these  nuanced  
diagnoses  which  fit  his  clinical  experience  could  be  produced  through  carefully  building  case  studies  of  
patients.  Consequently,  Kanner  favoured  classificatory  systems  that  made  use  of  very  many  different  diagnoses,
even  if  this  meant  that  the  clinical  pictures  associated  with  each  diagnosis  might  only  be  distinguishable  by  
the  expert  clinician.2  
A  new  notion  of  autism  was  formulated  by  Lorna  Wing  in  the  1970s.  This  would  gradually  replace  
Kanner’s  notion  and  would  become  the  major  notion  employed  from  around  the  late  1980s  onwards.  Wing  
came  from  a  very  different  perspective  to  Kanner,  largely  adopting  the  changes  which  had  occurred  from  the  
1960s  onwards  (Evans,  2017,  p.297;  Eyal  et  al  2010,  p.203  &  225).  Wing  believed  that  it  was  important  for  
psychiatric  disorders  to  be  described  in  ways  that  would  ensure  they  could  be  diagnosed  reliably.  She  
employed  statistical  methods  to  try  to  demarcate  between  disorders  rather  than  demarcating  between  them  on  
the  basis  of  postulated  causes.  In  setting  out  her  description  of  autism,  Wing  conducted  a  study  that  looked  at
children  known  to  a  local  health  service  who  exhibited  social  impairments,  verbal  and  non-verbal  language  
impairments  or  repetitive,  stereotyped  behaviour  (Wing  &  Gould  1979,  p.13).  She  then  investigated  what  other 
symptoms  were  exhibited  by  these  children  and  statistically  analysed  the  results.  She  found  two  groupings  
stood  out.  Firstly,  there  was  a  group  with  significant  social  impairments.  Secondly,  there  was  a  group  with  
normal  sociability  but  limited  intellect.  Those  in  the  socially  impaired  group  often  had  symptoms  which  were  
lacking  in  the  sociable  but  low  intellect  group.  She  found  that  symptoms  which  had  previously  been  
associated  with  childhood  schizophrenia  and  its  subtypes  (such  as  emotional  flatness,  muteness  or  echolalia,  
absence  or  marked  repetitiveness  of  symbolic  activities,  and  an  interest  pattern  consisting  entirely  or  partly  of  
repetitive  activities)  occurred  in  virtually  all  of  the  socially  impaired  group  (Wing  &  Gould  1979,  p.20).  Since
those  behaviours  were  only  associated  with  the  socially  impaired  group,  and  were  not  associated  with  the  
social  but  low  intellect  group,  Wing  decided  to  demarcate  a  new  diagnoses  (which  she  named  autism)  around  
social  impairments.  This  was  intended  to  replace  childhood  schizophrenia  and  its  subtypes  (Wing  &  Gould  
1979,  p.12;  see  also  Evans  2017,  p.296).  In  addition,  since  the  severity  of  symptoms  was  correlated  with  the  
degree  of  social  skills  impairment  she  decided  that  autism  was  a  spectrum  which  could  vary  from  high  to  
low  functioning  (Wing  &  Gould  1979,  p.26).  This  meant  that  many  children  who  would  have  been  previously 
diagnosed  with  childhood  schizophrenia  or  its  subtypes  were  now  placed  upon  the  autistic  spectrum. 
The  diagnosis  Wing  proposed  differed  from  Kanner’s  notion  of  autism.  Wing  checked  her  study  to  
see  if  any  of  the  groupings  she  had  identified  corresponded  to  groupings  that  had  been  picked  out  by  
previous  psychiatrists.  Of  all  those  checked,  she  could  only  detect  Kanner’s  autism.  However,  though  Kanner’s
autism  was  present,  she  argued  for  abandoning  Kanner’s  diagnosis  because  it  was  statistically  insignificant  
within  her  study.  She  believed  that  key  symptoms  she  found  “did  not  differentiate  those  with  and  without  a  
history  of  typical  [Kanner's]  autism.  On  the  other  hand,  they  were  very  significantly  associated  with  the  
degree  of  social  impairment”  (Wing  &  Gould  1979,  p.22).  Consequently,  she  removed  the  subtypes,  including  
Kanner's  notion  of  autism.  In  summary,  Wing  merged  together  much  of  what  had  previously  been  distinct  
types  of  childhood  schizophrenia  and  reconceptualised  them  as  an  autistic  spectrum.
Both  Kanner  and  Wing  largely  reflected  the  wider  environment  that  they  worked  in  and  this  partly  
accounts  for  why  they  produced  quite  different  notions  of  autism.  Kanner  valued  understanding  the  individual  
patient,  including  their  particular  psychological  profile,  whereas  Wing  valued  reliable  diagnoses  which  were  the
product  of  statistical  analysis.  Kanner  thus  produced  narrow  subtypes  which  only  an  expert  clinician  could  
distinguish  whereas  Wing  produced  very  broad,  but  relatively  easy  to  diagnose,  spectrum.  
In  line  with  Wing’s  approach,  the  DSM-III  (APA  1980,  p.375)  and  the  revised  edition  (APA  1987,  
p.187)  explicitly  states  that  children  being  diagnosed  with  autism  were  previously  diagnosed  with  childhood  
schizophrenia  or  its  subtypes.  By  this  point  the  old  notion  of  childhood  schizophrenia  had  been  abandoned  
and  focus  had  moved  on  to  the  notion  of  autism.3
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  history  above  differs  from  an  account  of  Wing’s  work  that  has  become  
prevalent,  but  is  I  shall  argue  inaccurate  (I  thank  an  anonymous  reviewer  for  raising  this  point).  Many  might  
consider  Wing  to  have  endorsed  subtyping  the  autistic  spectrum  because  she  is  commonly  understood  to  have  
introduced  Asperger's  syndrome  to  English  language  psychiatry  and  to  have  popularised  the  diagnosis.  
2 When  Kanner  formulated  his  diagnosis  of  autism  in  1943  he  assigned  autism  a  more  specific  symptom  
profile  compared  to  childhood  schizophrenia  and  considered  them  as  separate  diagnoses  (Kanner  1943,  
p.248).    In  1949  he  would  consider  them  as  “indistinguishable”  (1949,  p.419)  before  seeing  them  as  
related  in  the  1950s  and  a  subtype  in  the  1960s.
3 The  findings  of  Wing’s  study,  specifically  that  autism  varied  significantly  in  severity,  were  not  present  in  
DSM-III  notions  of  autism  (APA  1980),  which  primarily  focused  upon  individuals  taken  as  having  low  
intellect,  but  they  were  largely  adopted  from  DSM-III-R  (the  revised  edition)  onwards  (APA  1987).
8
However,  Wing  did  not  introduce  Asperger's  syndrome  (a  point  also  emphasised  by  Verheoff  (2013,  p.451)).  
Following  Asperger's  publication  on  the  syndrome  in  1944  his  work  was  largely  only  known  to  German  and  
Japanese  psychiatry.  However,  in  1971  Van  Krevelen  (1971)  published  a  paper  on  Asperger's  syndrome  in  the  
first  issue  of  the  Journal  of  Autism  and  Childhood  schizophrenia  (the  journal  which  Leo  Kanner  founded  and  
edited).  Thus  Wing  did  not  introduce  Asperger's  syndrome  to  English  language  psychiatry.  However,  she  did  
write  an  article  on  Asperger's  syndrome  in  1981  which  did  ultimately  lead  to  the  popularisation  of  Asperger's  
syndrome.  Wing,  however,  was  quite  explicit  in  that  paper  that  she  did  not  think  Asperger's  syndrome  was  a  
separate  diagnosis  to  autism  or  distinct  from  autism.  She  writes  that  “[s]ub-grouping  on  factors  such  as  level  
of  intelligence  (Bartak  &  Rutter,  1976)  or  on  degree  of  impairment  of  social  interaction  (DeMyer,  1976;  Wing
&  Gould,  1979)  has  more  useful  practical  implications  for  education  and  management  than  any  based  on  the  
eponymous  syndromes  [she  refers  here  to  previously  employed  diagnoses,  including  Asperger's  syndrome]”  
(1981,  p.124).  Thus  Wing  is  arguing  that  there  is  no  important  distinction  between  Asperger's  syndrome  and  
the  wider  autistic  spectrum.  On  the  contrary,  she  is  suggesting  that  other  factors  are  much  more  important  and
she  is  arguing  that  Asperger's  syndrome  should  not  be  a  separate  diagnosis.  In  later  writings  she  writes  that  
“various  workers  have  tended  to  the  belief  that  Asperger  syndrome  and  autism  are  different  conditions—quite  
the  opposite  of  my  intention”  (2000,  p.418).  She  considered  it  “ironic”  (2000,  p.430)  that  she  is  often  taken  
as  promoting  Asperger's  syndrome  as  being  somehow  distinct  from  autism.4
4.2  Three  Discontinuities
I  now  consider  three  different  instances  of  discontinuity  which  occurred  across  the  changes  I  have  described.  
The  first  discontinuity  relates  to  approaches  to  categorisation.  Kanner  was  ‘a  splitter’,  preferring  to  split  
diagnoses  into  subtypes,  whereas  Wing  was  ‘a  lumper’,  preferring  to  employ  a  smaller  number  of  diagnoses.  
Kanner  placed  children  into  distinct  subtypes  based  on  subtle  qualitative  differences  in  their  symptomatology.  
In  contrast,  Wing  saw  most  of  these  children  as  being  somewhere  on  an  autistic  spectrum  and  differentiated  
only  on  the  basis  of  quantitative  variation  in  levels  of  impairment.  Kanner  favoured  nuanced  subtypes  because 
he  valued  a  diagnostic  system  that  when  used  by  experts  might  be  hoped  to  provide  detailed  descriptions  of  
patients.  In  contrast,  Wing  valued  high  reliability  in  diagnosis  and  so  demarcated  subtypes  simply  on  level  of  
functioning  rather  than  on  the  presence  of  subtle  differences  in  symptomatology  (subtypes  can  reduce  
reliability  because  it  can  be  difficult  to  determine  which  subtype  an  individual  fits,  and  an  individual  might  
not  fit  any  subtype,  or  might  fit  multiple  subtypes).  Two  different  perspectives,  with  different  goals,  
experimental,  methodological  and  theoretical  understandings,  thus  resulted  in  two  different  classifications  
despite  both  covering  individuals  exhibiting  largely  the  same  behaviour.  
  The  second  discontinuity  between  the  approaches  of  Kanner  and  Wing  relates  to  how  they  conceived 
of  the  relationship  between  children  they  considered  autistic,  and  those  children  who  do  hallucinate.  From  the  
1930s  to  the  1970s  some  of  those  rare  children  who  hallucinated  were  considered  to  have  childhood  
schizophrenia  because  they  were  taken  as  undergoing  psychological  processes  which  had  a  degree  of  similarity
to  non-hallucinating  children  diagnosed  with  childhood  schizophrenia  (Bender  1947,  p.41  &  50).5  On  Kanner’s  
approach,  children  who  hallucinate,  and  those  he  described  as  having  childhood  schizophrenia  (or  one  of  its  
subtypes)  could  have  related  disorders.  In  contrast,  on  Wing’s  approach  children  who  hallucinate,  and  those  
she  placed  on  the  autistic  spectrum  have  conditions  that  are  not  taken  to  be  related.  Following  Wing’s  
approach,  from  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  Third  Edition  (DSM-III,  the  main  diagnostic  manual  
used  in  psychiatry)  onwards  children  who  hallucinate  would  typically  meet  diagnostic  criteria  for  
schizophrenia,  a  condition  that  the  DSM-III  takes  to  be  unrelated  to  autism  and  cannot  be  diagnosed  alongside
autism  (APA  1980,  p.375;  Cantor  et  al,  1982,  p.758).  
A  third  discontinuity  between  Kanner  and  Wing’s  approaches  relates  to  changes  in  the  symptoms  they 
associate  with  autism.  A  symptom  which  Kanner  heavily  emphasised  was  no  longer  described,  or  at  least  
heavily  reformulated,  in  Wing's  notion  of  autism.  Kanner  describes  a  symptom  he  named  ‘maintenance  of  the  
same’  (Kanner  1943,  p.245).  Kanner  described  children  who  insisted  upon  their  environment  remaining  near  
identical.  He  writes  that  “[t]he  child's  behaviour  is  governed  by  an  anxious  obsessive  desire  for  the  
4 Wing's  motive  for  using  the  term  ‘Asperger's  syndrome’  is  that  it  lacked  many  of  the  connotations  
associated  with  autism.  Wing  writes  that  some  individuals  who  she  thinks  are  on  the  autistic  spectrum  “are
perplexing  to  parents,  teachers  and  work  supervisors,  who  often  cannot  believe  in  a  diagnosis  of  autism,  
which  they  equate  with  muteness  and  total  social  withdrawal.  The  use  of  a  diagnostic  term  [Asperger's  
syndrome]  and  reference  to  Asperger's  clinical  descriptions  help  to  convince  the  people  concerned  that  there
is  a  real  problem”  (1981,  p.124;  see  also  2000,  p.419-420)).  She  felt  the  Asperger's  syndrome  was  an  
useful  way  of  convincing  people  they  were  on  the  autistic  spectrum  since  it  lacked  the  connotations  of  
“autism”.
5 Some  children  who  hallucinated  were  not  considered  to  have  childhood  schizophrenia  if  they  were  believed
to  not  have  the  underlying  psychological  approaches  associated  with  childhood  schizophrenia.  9
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maintenance  of  sameness”  (Kanner  1943,  p.245).  They  reacted  very  adversely  to  any  changes  to  their  
environment.  This  does  have  some  similarities  to  Wing's  notion  that  autistic  people  exhibit  repetitive  
movements,  routines  and  have  a  narrow  range  of  obsessive  interests  (Wing  &  Gould  1979,  p.16).  However,  
Kanner's  notion  of  maintenance  of  the  same  was  narrower  than  these  symptoms.  It  specifically  related  to  a  
need  to  keep  the  environment  the  same  and  the  children  he  described  suffered  significant  distress  when  the  
environment  changed.  Repetitive  behaviours  and  obsessive  interests  have  many  more  aspects  than,  and  often  
do  not  involve,  avoiding  changes  to  the  environment  or  avoiding  anxiety  (Verhoeff  2013,  p.45).
These  variances  in  views  do  not  easily  fit  typical  scientific  realism.  A  realist  would  want  to  know  
which  account  of  autism  is  the  correct  one,  and  would  face  the  worry  that  we  cannot  work  out  which  is  the  
correct  one.  This  would  no  doubt  encourage  sceptics  of  psychiatric  diagnoses  who  see  psychiatric  diagnoses  
being  made-up  and  would  see  Kanner's  and  Wing's  approaches  as  no  better  than  any  random  diagnosis  a  
psychiatrist  felt  like  making  up.  Nothing  on  Verheoff’s  approach  would  block  this  concern.  In  response,  I  
draw  upon  perspectivism  to  suggest  that,  by  accepting  the  legitimacy  of  multiple  models,  both  can  be  
considered  true.  Also,  by  showing  that  they  pass  epistemic  criteria  which  many  made-up  diagnoses  would  fail, 
we  should  not  adopt  scepticism  regarding  these  psychiatric  diagnoses.  
4.3  –  Discontinuity  and  Perspectivism
I  now  consider  each  of  the  three  discontinuities  described  above  to  consider  what  epistemic  consequences  
should  follow  from  them.  I  consider  what  consequences  they  have  for  notions  of  truth  and  consider  whether  
they  should  entail  scepticism  by  drawing  upon  the  perspectival  realism  of  Giere  and  Massimi.  I  take  the  
behaviour  which  people  exhibit  to  be  the  real,  objective,  non-perspectival  target  which  psychiatric  diagnoses,  
via  psychiatric  symptoms,  aim  to  describe.  I  use  the  word  behaviour  in  the  broad  sense  of  not  just  bodily  
actions  but  also  activity  of  the  psyche  such  as  feelings  and  perceptions.  If  one  is  willing  to  accept  that  there  
is  a  mind-independent  world  then  it  seems  acceptable  that  there  are  people  in  the  world  and  that  people  are  
not  simply  static.  Rather,  people  dynamically  engage  with  and  respond  to  their  own  psyche  and  their  external  
environment  both  in  bodily  actions  and  in  the  activity  of  the  psyche.  I  call  that  engagement  and  response  
'behaviour'  and  consider  it  real,  objective  and  non-perspectival.  Psychologists  and  psychiatrists  can  study  
behaviour  in  a  variety  of  perspectival  manners  such  as  theory-laden  observations  and  experiments.  They  can  
also  produce  perspectival  models  of  that  behaviour.  Eventually,  psychiatrists  group  various  behaviours  into  
perspectival  psychiatric  symptoms  in  a  manner  which  will  abstract  some  of  the  specific  details  of  actual  
instances  of  behaviour.  For  example,  there  will  be  particular  details  relating  to  any  actual  instance  of  social  
interaction  (length  of  time  speaking,  manner  of  speaking,  words  said)  but  those  particular  details  are  abstracted
away  by  being  considered  instances  of  the  generalised  symptom  low  social  skills  (Fellowes  2017,  p.285).  
Psychiatric  symptoms  are  then  grouped  together  into  perspectival  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Somebody  who  exhibits
enough  symptoms  of  a  psychiatric  diagnosis  will  receive  the  diagnosis  (sometimes  other  criteria  also  need  
passing).  This  means  the  perspectival  psychiatric  diagnosis  will,  via  perspectival  psychiatric  symptoms,  describe
the  non-perspectival  behaviour.  The  non-perspectival  behaviour  of  patients  were  grouped  by  Kanner  and  Wing  
together  into  perspectival  psychiatric  symptoms  and  perspectival  psychiatric  diagnoses.  I  now  show  how,  by  
considering  the  constraints  which  Giere  and  Massimi  put  on  truth,  both  Kanner’s  and  Wing’s  approaches  can  
be  considered  perspectival  realist.
The  first  discontinuity  is  that  Kanner  was  a  splitter,  producing  subtypes  which  vary  qualitatively,  
whereas  Wing  was  a  lumper,  producing  a  spectrum  which  demarcated  different  ways  of  being  autistic  purely  
on  severity.  Perspectivism  can  see  both  perspectives  as  true.  On  Giere's  approach,  both  Kanner’s  approach  and
Wing’s  approach  have  a  level  of  similarity  to  actual  patients.  Kanner's  approach  has  similarity  because  it  
allows  each  subtype  to  give  more  precise  descriptions  of  patients.  Wing's  approach  has  similarity  because  
many  of  the  inaccuracies  of  employing  subtypes  were  removed.  Kanner's  approach  of  employing  multiple  
subtypes  with  different  symptomatology  increases  accuracy  but  decreases  reliability,  whereas  Wing  formulating  
a  spectrum  decreases  accuracy  but  increases  reliability.  Increasing  accuracy  means  that  Kanner’s  subtypes  more
closely  reflect  the  target  (the  behaviour  of  particular  individuals)  compared  to  Wing’s  spectrum.  However,  
increasing  reliability  reduces  the  number  of  times  that  people  are  given  the  incorrect  diagnosis,  meaning  the  
target  is  more  likely  to  be  correctly  considered  an  instance  of  one  diagnosis  rather  than  mistakenly  considered 
an  instance  of  a  different  diagnosis.  Whether  greater  accuracy  (more  closely  reflecting  the  target)  or  reliability 
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(reducing  how  often  the  wrong  diagnosis  is  applied  to  the  target)  produces  the  most  similarity  to  the  world  
depends  on  perspective  dependent  views  on  similarity.  
On  Massimi’s  approach,  past  perspectives  can  be  judged  by  later  evidence.  There  are  multiple  recent  
studies  which  have  tried  to  detect  symptomatically  characterised  subtypes  of  the  autistic  spectrum  which  do  
not  simply  vary  in  level  of  severity.  Some  studies  posited  possible  subtypes  (de  Gaimbattista  et  al  2019,  
p.147;  Fitzgerald  2019,  p.4;  Lai  et  al  2013,  p.2;  Newson,  Marechal  &  David  2003,  p.596).  However,  studies  
into  subtyping  typically  produce  no  clear  results  (Charman  et  al  2011,  p.12;  Munson  et  al  2011,  p.2).  
Proposed  subtypes  typically  lack  significant  statistical  strength,  they  typically  overlap  with  one  another  and  
there  is  usually  no  obvious  reason  to  favour  one  set  of  proposed  subtypes  above  another  proposed  set.  
Consequently,  any  particular  individual  will  typically  only  loosely  fit  a  particular  subtype  or  will  fit  multiple  
proposed  subtypes.  At  the  same  time,  the  possibility  of  subtyping  is  far  from  ruled  out.  The  acceptability  of  
subtypes  depends  upon  willingness  to  sacrifice  parsimony  and  reliability  to  increase  the  fit  between  a  
diagnosis  and  at  least  some  patients.  As  such  neither  Kanner's  nor  Wing's  approaches  can  be  said  to  have  
been  disproved  by  evidence  generated  in  a  later  perspective. 
The  second  discontinuity  is  that  Kanner  did  not  see  children  who  hallucinate  (and  who  also  have  
some  symptoms  of  childhood  schizophrenia)  as  being  importantly  different  from  those  with  other  forms  of  
childhood  schizophrenia  whereas  Wing  thought  it  important  to  distinguish  between  those  who  hallucinate  and  
her  autistic  spectrum.  From  Giere’s  modelling  perspective  children  who  hallucinate  can  either  be  modelled  in  a
manner  which  links  them  to  autistic  children  or  in  a  manner  that  makes  them  distinct  from  autistic  children.  
Some  symptoms  are  common  across  modern  notions  of  autism  and  modern  notions  of  schizophrenia  (e.g.  
social  withdrawal,  difficulties  connecting  emotionally,  oddities  in  speech,  abnormal  cognition).  In  contrast,  some
symptoms  are  specific  to  each  group,  (e.g.  hallucinations  are  not  present  in  autism  whilst  repetitive  behaviour  
often  takes  a  quite  different  form  in  schizophrenia).  Kanner  and  Wing  place  different  priority  on  
hallucinations.  Kanner  models  in  a  manner  where  hallucinations  are  not  considered  crucial  for  demarcation,  
rather,  what  binds  childhood  schizophrenia  is  a  number  of  related  underlying  psychological  processes  
(additionally, as  I  outline  in  the  next  paragraph,  this  is  compatible  with  current  evidence).  He  thought  that  
these  underlying  psychological  processes  could  occasionally  give  rise  to  hallucinations.  Consequently,  he  related
together  those  children  who  hallucinate  and  those  who  do  not.  In  contrast,  Wing  desired  diagnoses  which  
could  be  reliably  diagnosed.  She  did  not  think  psychiatric  diagnoses  should  be  based  upon  speculation  about  
underlying  psychological  processes.  Consequently,  she  intended  to  formulate  diagnoses  based  upon  which  
symptoms  statistically  correlated  together.  Since  hallucinations  were  statistically  insignificant  within  the  autistic  
spectrum  she  considered  them  to  be  indicative  of  a  different  diagnosis.  Which  approach  best  models  reality  
depends  upon  perspective  dependent  judgements  over  what  types  of  similarity  are  considered  most  important. 
Turning  to  consider  Massimi’s  approach,  there  is  no  clear  evidence  which  has  been  raised  in  
subsequent  perspectives  which  would  disprove  earlier  perspectives.  It  remains  a  live  debate  whether  children  
who  hallucinate  (and  who  would  now  be  diagnosed  as  schizophrenic)  should  be  considered  to  have  a  
condition  related  to  autism.  Around  a  quarter  to  half  of  individuals  who  meet  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  
childhood  onset  schizophrenia  also  meet  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  an  autism  spectrum  disorder  (Rapoport  et  al
2009,  p.11).  Whether  one  condition  can  cause  the  other,  can  be  a  risk  factor  for  the  other,  or  whether  these  
are  alternative  forms  of  the  same  disorder  is  a  question  which  is  being  investigated  (Rapoport  et  al  2009,  
p.12).  Many  of  the  cognitive  processes  which  are  today  associated  with  the  autistic  spectrum  can  be  found  in 
individuals  diagnosed  with  schizophrenia,  (in  relation  to  theory  of  mind  see  Sprong,  et  al  (2007,  p.10),  for  
executive  dysfunction  see  (Orellana  &  Slachevsky,  2013,  p.5),  for  weak  central  coherence  see  Happé  &  Frith  
(2006,  p.15)).  Evidence  to  date  seems  compatible  with  both  Kanner's  and  Wing's  approach.  
Thirdly,  there  is  the  discontinuity  over  changing  symptoms.  Kanner  posits  a  symptom  of  maintenance  
of  the  same  whereas  Wing  posited  the  much  more  watered  down  symptoms  of  repetitions,  routines  and  
obsessions.  Specific  aspects  which  Kanner  describes  are  absent  on  Wing’s  account.  On  Giere’s  approach,  both  
Kanner  and  Wing  succeed  in  fairly  well  describing  the  symptoms  of  the  populations  they  consider  autistic.  
Remember  that  Kanner’s  ‘autism’  is  a  narrower  diagnosis  than  Wing’s.  Kanner  thought  of  autism  as  a  rare  
condition  that  was  a  subtype  of  childhood  schizophrenia.  In  contrast,  Wing  took  most  of  the  children  who  
would  have  been  described  as  having  different  types  of  childhood  schizophrenia  by  Kanner  and  re-described  
them  as  being  on  the  autistic  spectrum.  I  suggest  that  the  difference  in  populations  means  that  ‘maintenance  
of  the  same’  was  indeed  a  symptom  of  Kanner’s  autism,  but  not  of  Wing’s.  Kanner  thought  that  the  symptom
maintenance  of  the  same  was  specific  to  autism,  and  was  only  rarely  seen  in  childhood  schizophrenia  or  its  
other  subtypes  (Kanner  &  Lesser  1958).  Given  the  specific  behaviour  which  children  with  the  subtype  of  
autism  were  exhibiting  and  given  Kanner's  goal  of  clinical  nuance  there  was  good  reason  to  posit  the  
symptom  maintenance  of  the  same.  Wing  then  removed  those  subtypes  when  she  formulated  the  autistic  
spectrum.  When  investigating  that  broad  grouping  she  would  have  found  maintenance  of  the  same  to  be  a  
rare  symptom.  The  behaviour  which  was  considered  instances  of  maintenance  of  the  same  was  common  within
Kanner’s  narrow  subtype  of  autism  whereas  it  was  rare  within  Wing’s  much  larger  autistic  spectrum.  
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Consequently,  the  symptom  of  maintenance  of  the  same  would  not  meet  her  standard  of  statistical  significance
and  so,  by  that  standard,  she  had  no  reason  to  believe  it  was  a  symptom  associated  with  the  autistic  
spectrum.  Rather,  she  instead  formulated  the  broader  and  more  nebulous  symptoms  of  repetitive  and  restrictive 
behaviour.  By  being  less  specific  those  symptoms  would  have  covered  more  individuals  than  maintenance  of  
the  same  and  so  were  statistically  significant  within  the  autistic  spectrum.  In  both  cases,  the  same  non-
perspectival  behaviour  is  present  but  different  perspectives  justify  describing  the  behaviour  by  formulating  
different  symptoms. 
Additionally,  turning  to  Massimi’s  approach,  there  is  no  subsequent  evidence  which  would  disprove  
the  notions  posited  by  either  perspective.  Modern  evidence  suggests  repetitive  behaviour  is  a  diverse  
phenomena.  It  can  stem  from  an  autistic  individual  having  an  obsessive  interest  in  a  narrow  area,  it  can  be  
an  attempt  to  handle  anxiety,  it  can  relate  to  executive  dysfunctions,  or  to  difficulty  with  planning,  or      to  
handling  unexpected  changes  etc.  (Cuccaro  et  al  2003,  p.12;  Doan  &  Fenton  2013,  p.51;  Szatmari  et  al  2006, 
p.587)  There  are  many  different  ways  these  behaviours  could  be  grouped  together.  No  current  evidence  
disproves  Kanner's  approach  or  Wing's  approach  when,  judged  from  their  respective  perspectives.
5  Ethical  and  practical  grounds  for  preferring  either  perspective
Having  argued  that  both  Kanner’s  and  Wing’s  perspective  are  equally  acceptable  on  epistemic  grounds  I  now  
consider  if  there  are  ethical  or  practical  grounds  to  favour  either  perspective.  Here  I  will  consider  which  
perspective  is  most  clinically  useful  and  most  beneficial  for  diagnosed  individuals.  Doing  this  also  links  
perspectivism  with  issues  of  science  in  use.  It  has  been  argued  that  autistic  individuals  have  valuable  lived  
experience  which  means  autistic  individuals  should  play  a  central  role  in  answering  ethical  and  practical  
questions  (Fletcher-Watson  et  al  2019,  p.944).  As  a  diagnosed  autistic  individual  my  thoughts  upon  this  will  
have  been  influenced  by  my  own  lived  experience  (although  it  should  be  emphasised  that  my  views  are  far  
from  representative  of  all  autistic  individuals).
For  brevity  I  shall  focus  upon  whether  ethical  and  practical  considerations  support  subtypes  or  
abandoning  subtypes.    Here  I  disagree  with  the  claims  made  by  Silberman  in  his  influential  popular  history  of
autism  book  Neurotribes.  He  argues  that  subtypes  of  autism  are  “prefabricated  pigeonholes”  (Silberman  2015,  
p.187)  which  unrealistically  constrain  how  we  think  of  autistic  people.  In  contrast,  when  subtypes  were  
abandoned  the  “full  breadth”  (Silberman  2015,  p.503  )  of  the  autistic  spectrum  was  revealed,  helping  us  see  
the  ways  in  which  autism  can  manifest.  Silberman  argues  this  helps  us  understand  autistic  people  better  and  
helped  give  those  newly  identified  autistic  individuals  a  voice  (Silberman  2015,  p.44).6
In  contrast  to  Silberman  I  argue  that  a  non-subtyped  spectrum  can  conceal  diversity  by  de-
emphasising  rarer  aspects.  Within  a  spectrum  some  characteristics  will  be  relatively  common  and  some  will  be
relatively  rare.  The  more  common  characteristics  will  be  more  prominent  compared  to  the  rarer  characteristics  
and  so  the  more  common    characteristics  can  conceal  rarer  characteristics  (prominence  can  also  depend  upon  
how  overt  a  characteristic  is  and  how  much  it  is  actively  promoted  in  scientific  papers,  the  media  and  
advocacy).  In  contrast,  adding  subtypes  to  a  spectrum  can  reveal  those  rarer  characteristics.  A  characteristic  
which  is  uncommon  within  a  spectrum  can  be  common  within  a  subtype.  There  can  be  characteristics  which  
are  considered  present  within  both  the  wider  spectrum  and  the  subtype  but,  given  how  rare  it  is  within  the  
spectrum,  it  gains  significant  prominence  due  to  it  being  emphasised  by  being  present  in  the  subtype.  Simply  
thinking  of  the  spectrum  does  not  emphasise  the  symptom  whereas  also  thinking  of  the  subtype  does  
emphasise  it.  Alternatively,  there  can  be  characteristics  which  are  only  formulated  when  there  is  sub-typing.  
An  example  of  this  is  how  maintenance  of  the  same  was  a  common  symptom  of  Kanner’s  autism  and  was  
then  removed  and  reformulated  into  the  weaker  symptom  of    repetitive  behaviours    and    obsessive    interests  
in  Wing’s  autistic  spectrum.  A  subtype  was  needed  for  the  symptom  of  maintenance  of  the  same  to  reach  
statistical  significance  so  the  symptom  was  no  longer  formulated  in  Wing’s  spectrum.
A  symptom  being  emphasised  or  formulated  due  to  a  subtype  has  clinical  benefits.  When  a  symptom  
is  emphasised  then  attention  is  drawn  to  what  is  otherwise  a  rare  symptom.  This  is  important  because  subtle  
symptoms  can  go  undetected  (Fellowes  forthcoming).  When  a  more  specific  symptom  is  only  formulated  due  
to  a  subtype  then  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  particular  behaviour  is  possible  compared  to  covering  that 
behaviour  with  a  more  generalised  symptom.  Subtyping  can  also  help  with  understanding  diagnosed  individuals
outside  the  clinical  domain.  The  notion  or  notions  of  autism  that  people  have,  especially  individuals  without  
psychiatric  or  psychological  training,  will  be  influenced  by  more  prominent  aspects  of  autism.  A  subtype  can  
increase  the  prominence  of  a  symptom  by  emphasising  it  or  if  it  is  only  formulated  due  to  the  subtype.  This  
will  help  everyday  interactions  with  autistic  people,  help  media  portrayals  of  autistic  individuals,  help  guide  
building  support  services  and  help  guide  making  reasonable  adjustments  (Fellowes  2017,  p.57).  Finally,  
subtyping  can  help  give  autistic  individuals  a  voice.  Scientists  or  policy  makers  who  wish  to  consult  autistic  
6 It is worth noting that I also disagree with many of Silberman's historical claims, especially those relating to Kanner 
(see Fellowes 2017; Fellowes 2020a).
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individuals  could  ensure  they  gain  a  more  representative  picture  of  autism  if  they  sought  out  individuals  with  
subtypes.  It  would  also  help  autistic  advocates  represent  multiple  ways  of  being  autistic.  Speaking  from  
personal  experience,  having  a  desire  to  ensure  that  I  represent  multiple  ways  of  being  autistic  when  
advocating,  rather  than  merely  presenting  my  own  way  of  being  autistic  as  representative  of  autism  in  general,
does  relatively  little  to  inform  me  of  what  other  ways  there  are  of  being  autistic.  Had  I  been  able  to  refer  to
subtypes  then  I  would  have  guidance  over  the  various  ways  in  which  autism  can  manifest  (Fellowes  2020b,  
p.45).
6  Conclusion
Sociologists  and  historians,  such  as  Verhoeff,  Rose  and  Young,  have  made  important  observations  about  the  
ways  in  which  knowledge  claims  vary  over  time  in  science.  Whilst  insightful,  their  discussions  do  not  readily 
translate  into  those  concerning  scientific  realism  as  discussed  by  philosophers  of  science.  In  this  paper  I  have  
shown  how  scientific  perspectivism  can  accommodate  notions  of  truth  being  relativised  to  historical  eras  whilst
still  retaining  a  form  of  scientific  realism.  
Scientific  perspectivism  can  be  of  use  in  developing  a  framework  for  applying  notions  of  truth  to  
psychiatry.  I  suggest  that  scientific  perspectivism  offers  significant  resources  to  block  the  risk  of  an  extreme  
relativism  by  demarcating  between  truth  and  objective  reality.  It  also  puts  down  constraints  upon  what  counts  
as  a  truth  in  the  form  of  Giere's  criteria  of  similarity  and  Massimi's  criteria  of  evidence  gathered  in  other  
perspectives.  This  is  important  because  it  is  easy  to  take  discontinuous  changes  as  reason  to  be  sceptical  
about  current  psychiatric  diagnoses.  Unless  one  advocates  for  a  blanket  scepticism  there  needs  to  be  some  
way  of  determining  when  scepticism  is  reasonable  and  when  it  is  not.  Many  critics  consider  psychiatric  
diagnoses  to  be  arbitrary  constructs  and  made  up  inventions  rather  than  legitimate  scientific  knowledge.  This  
has  lead  to  calls  to  abandon  using  psychiatric  diagnoses,  including  autism.  I  have  shown  that  historical  
evidence  which  demonstrates  discontinuities  in  thinking  about  autism  need  not  support  such  claims.  For    
scientific  perspectivists,  past  views  regarding  autism  can  differ  significantly  from  present  views,  with  neither  
being  wrong.
Scientific  perspectivism  is  not  problem  free.  Scientific  perspectivists  have  argued  that  perspectivism  is  
a  unique  position  but  how  successful  it  is  can  certainly  be  debated.  It  needs  walk  a  tight  line  to  avoid  falling
into  non-perspectival  scientific  realism  or  into  anti-realism  (Chakravartty  2010,  p.409;  Morrison  2011,  p.351).  
Scientific  perspectivism,  in  the  forms  outlined  by  Giere  and  Massimi,  is  a  relatively  new  approach  so  if  these 
issues  can  be  resolved  then  this  will  likely  be  some  time  in  the  future.  Additionally,  even  if  scientific  
perspectivism  collapses  into  other  positions,  the  constraints  upon  truth  I  have  discussed  may  still  be  useful  
ways  to  assess  historical  and  sociological  changes  and  block  an  ‘anything  goes’  relativism  even  if  there  is  
still  the  outstanding  question  of  whether  passing  them  delivers  full  scientific  realism  or  anti-realism.
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